115, 975 P.2d 536(1999). To that end, the PRA "provides for a more liberal
recovery of costs. . ." Id. But liberal recovery is not unlimited, as has been made
clear by recent cases affirming significant reductions of PRA fee awards. See
Sanders, 169 Wn.2d at 865-68; Cedar Grove Compostinci, Inc. v. City of
Marysville, 188 Wn. App. 695, 731, 354 P.3d 249 (2015). Costs and attorney
fees are subject to a reasonableness requirement. ACLU, 95 Wn. App. at 117;
Cedar Grove, 188 Wn. App. at 729.
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No. 74825-4-1/14
Applying CR 68 to the PRA is a reflection of this reasonableness
requirement: if a plaintiff fails to improve her position at trial, the costs and
attorney fees associated with the additional litigation are not reasonable, and
may be limited pursuant to CR 68. The reasonableness requirement inherent in
CR 68 is not in conflict with the PRA provision that the prevailing party "shall be
awarded all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in connection with
such legal action." RCW 42.56.550(4).
In addition, Rufin fails to distinguish the language in the PRA attorney fee
provision from similar statutes that are subject to CR 68 and provide for attorney
fees to the prevailing plaintiff. The Washington Law Against Discrimination
(WLAD), chapter 46.60 RCW,employs similar mandatory language regarding
imposition of attorney fees, and CR 68 has been applied to such disputes.3
Minger v. Reinhard Distrib. Co., 87 Wn. App. 941, 947, 943 P.2d 400 (1997);
Lietz v. Hansen Law Offices, P.S.C., 166 Wn. App. 571, 584, 271 P.3d 899
(2012).
Rufin also argues that the trial court correctly reasoned that applying CR