Moreover, the relief suggested as available through subrogation is altogether inadequate. No result short of enabling McCarthy to get what he paid for, or reimbursement, could meet for a moment the demands of equity. Under subrogation, reimbursement of course is out of the question; yet subrogation does not promise that McCarthy will be enabled to get what he paid for, and it cannot be applied so as to accomplish that result [4] without again involving Gleason. It follows, therefore, that if McCarthy is entitled to any adequate relief, it must be outside of subrogation and by independent action for reimbursement. That such an action does lie, without reference to statute, has been often decided (Henderson v. Overton 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 394, 24 Am. Dec. 492; Hoxter v. Poppleton, 9 Or. 481; Hall v. *329Dineen, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1017, 83 S. W. 120; Schwinger v. Hickok, 53 N. Y. 282; 24 Cyc., par. B.; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1024; note to Cowper v. Weaver’s Admr., 69 L. R. A. 56); when brought, it necessarily implies that subrogation has been waived, and it proceeds against the only party from whom reimbursement can come, viz., the judgment creditor who caused the sale and received the results thereof.