St.Rep. 1793, we stated the standard of review where a Dis-
trict Court has refused to set aside a default:
". . . [Wlhere th.e trial court has re-
fused to set aside the default, the
proper standard of review is that no
great abuse of discretion need be shown
to warrant a reversal. ... It is clear
that the issue of abuse of discretion
must be decided on a case-by-case basis."
Lords. 688 P.2d at 294.
The general ru1.e is that the neglect of an attorney is at-
tributable to his client so that mere attorney neglect is
insufficient to set aside a default. However, we recognized
in Lords that we have found attorney neglect excusable on the
part of the client upon the proper showing. Lords, 688 P. 2d
at 295. Therefore, in reviewing the decision of the lower
court we need not find a great abuse of discretion, but we
must find some abuse and a proper showing to excuse neglect
in order to set aside the default.
In Lo2ds the attorney had totally abandoned his clients
and this Court concluded that it would be unconscionable to
charge the client with the attorney neglect. We held that
the trial court abused its discretion. in not setting aside
the default where the attorney completely abandoned the
clients who had diligently tried. to correct the court's
action. Lords. 688 P.2d at 296.
The facts in the present case are distinguishable from
Lords. In Lords, the attorney abandoned his clients after he
made a general appearance on behalf of some of the clients
who had not been served with process and had not authorized
such general appearance. In the present case, we find a
continuing effort on the part of the attorney for plaintiffs
to obtain an answer from d-efendant's attorney, Morin. This
included writing letters, filing notices and telephoning, all
to no avail. However, Morin did. not abandon his clients and
leave the state. He received notices and talked on the phone
on behalf of the clients, but failed to do anything in re-
sponse to the numerous requests by opposing counsel. More-
over, once default had been entered on March 22, in eight
days attorney Morin moved to vacate that default. As demon-
strated in the telephone conversation of March 15, attorney
Morin intended to file an answer, but again postponed the
preparation and filing of that pleading. That procra.stina-
tion is a type of neglect which is properly attributable to a
client, and which we distinguish from the abandonment in
Lords.
This is not a factual situation where reasonable minds
might conclude that the conduct of attorney Morin was excus-
able. We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's
conclusion that the conduct was not excusable neglect. We
affirm the action of the District Court in refusing to vacate
the default judgment.