and Tenant Act of 1977, there is an implied warranty of
habitability present in the landlord/tenant relationship. In
Corricran, the tenants complained to their landlord after moving in
that when touching various portions of the plumbing system an
electric shock was received. Mr. and Mrs. Corrigan, as well as
numerous guests, experienced such shocks and requested that the
landlord have the electrical system inspected. It was also shown
that the previous tenant moved out because the landlord refused to
address the electrical problem. The landlord did nothing
throughout the Corrigans' tenancy, which lasted a year or more,
until Mr. Corrigan was killed by an electric shock while bathing.
While Corriqan is an example of a severe result from a
landlord's failure to maintain rental property in a habitable
condition, it bears similarity to the case at bar. There were
serious and ongoing problems that went unabated despite the
complaints of the tenants. In the case at bar the record indicates
that the sewer and water systems were problematic and there were
other conditions in the trailer court that were unclean and
dangerous. The fact that no one incurred a fatal accident because
of the lack of care exhibited by the landlords is irrelevant. The
instant case and Corriaan are identical in that the tenants
repeatedly made complaints about the unsafe and uninhabitable
conditions, all of which were either addressed inadequately or more
commonly not at all.
In Busch v. Kammerer (1982), 200 Mont. 130, 649 P.2d 1339, a
tenant's only source of domestic water came via a garden hose
stretched from a neighboring house above ground. We indicated that
such a condition was grounds for a claim against the landlord for
a violation of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which, as
stated in Corriaan, encompasses an implied warranty of
habitability.
Corriaan and Busch perpetuate the purpose and goals of the
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and are helpful by giving us
examples of violations of the warranty of habitability.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Magruder is particularly
revealing with regard to his true expectations of Brandvold in
maintaining or repairing the trailer court.
Q. And yet you expected him to handle all of the
business of the River Road Trailer Court.
A. Oh, no.
Q. The majority of it?
A. Just collecting the rent, and keeping the weeds cut
down.
The examples in Corrisan and Busch are similar to the case at
bar and we conclude that the landlords breached the warranty of
habitability.
In reviewing the case at bar we also note the District Court's
inconsistent treatment of the habitability issue. For instance, in
the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that spanned 26
pages, the court said:
The Court specifically finds that the River Road Trailer
Court was not clean nor were the grounds, buildings and
improvement[s] steadily in good order and repair.
Also the court found that the landlords failed to engage in cleanup
activity after tenants vacated the premises, yet the court ruled in
favor of the landlords and stated that the landlords met their duty
to maintain the premises, and that they took steps to remedy the
problems.
Also, after the court recited the condition of the trailer
court and the ongoing nature of the problems, it used the
adjectives "inconvenienced" and "discomfortw to describe what these
tenants experienced. As mentioned previously the record does not
support this characterization.
The tenants in the case at bar contended with ongoing serious
violations of habitability standards few of which were addressed by
the landlords in a timely manner, if at all. After reviewing the
record we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed under the third prong of the three-part
test we adopted in DeSave, 250 Mont. at 323, 820 P.2d at 1287, when
the District Court determined that the landlords did not breach the
warranty of habitability. We conclude that the landlords failed to
adequately maintain the trailer court in a habitable manner and
breached the warranty of habitability. Therefore, we reverse and
remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Reversed. We concur: