constitutional mandate for absolute secrecy.
Releasing voted ballots for general public inspection would risk revealing
the identity of individual voters. According to a declaration from the Elections
Director in the Office of the Secretary of State, voters sometimes place
identifying marks on ballots contrary to voting instructions, for example by signing
their names when making corrections or by writing comments about their intent.
Each time ballots are handled, there is the potential to misplace, damage, or lose
them. And as the Elections Director explains, where there is low turnout in a
small precinct, even a ballot devoid of identifying marks can be tied back to a
voter by comparing it with voters credited with returning ballots on particular
dates.
Releasing copies or images presents the same risk of identification of
voters as disclosure of the paper ballot. To hold that a copy or duplicate or
No. 72028-7-1/8
image file must be produced in response to a public records request would
undermine the constitutional mandate for absolute secrecy of ballots. We
conclude that the records White requests are "ballots" and they are subject to the
strict statutory regulation of ballot handling and storage.
White argues that the statutory objective is to keep ballots secure, an
objective he believes can be met while still allowing copies to be produced upon
request. White points out that when there is an election contest, members of the
public are allowed to serve as witnesses to the recounting of ballots. RCW
29A.64.030; RCW 29A.64.041(3); ch. 29A.68 RCW. In White's view, any
member of the public should similarly be allowed to see scanned images of