Skip to main content

Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 961328.pdf

Citation
Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 961328.pdf
Jurisdiction
Washington (state)
Source verification
official_capture_completeness_unverified

Related Parts of This Source

Full Text

1,727 chars
prematurely reaching constitutional claims that are not before us. SUGM does not

advance any specific argument on direct review claiming that the ministerial

exception applies and it does not explicitly argue its lawyers are ministers under

Hosanna-Tabor. SUGM correctly recognizes, “[I]n Hosanna-Tabor, it was the

employer who put the job role at issue as a constitutional, affirmative defense to a

generally applicable law.” Br. of Resp’t at 25. That is not the posture of the case

before us. Doctrinally speaking, courts consider Hosanna-Tabor’s reasoning when

raised as a constitutional defense to WLAD under the First Amendment—not to

construct reasonable grounds for the exemption under article I, section 12. Since

SUGM asserted the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense in its answer, CP

at 16, I would remand for further proceedings and allow the parties to brief and argue

about the applicability of that defense in the superior court. See, e.g., Erdman v.

Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 175 Wn.2d 659, 665-66, 286 P.3d 357 (2012)

-21-
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, 96132-8
(Stephens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)

(plurality opinion) (remanding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim for

further proceedings to establish whether the ministerial exception applies).

A remaining question is whether SUGM should also be able to pursue other

defenses grounded in claims of religious freedoms. Specifically, SUGM broadly

asserts application of WLAD to its employment decisions would violate its free

exercise rights under the First Amendment and article I, section 11 of the