of lenity. Both interpretive aids compel the same conclusion: RCW 68.50.140(4)
cannot be used to make a felony out of Southwick's decision to move cremains a
few feet to a new um garden to let the City access its lawful easement.
I therefore disagree with the majority's decision to uphold the finding that
Southwick violated this criminal statute. I respectfully dissent.
Standard of Review
The Department alleged that Southwick committed unprofessional conduct by
violating RCW 68.50.140(4). Thus, as the majority acknowledges, the key question
in this case is how to interpret that criminal statute. Majority at 1.
This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v.
Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015)(citing/« re Post Sentencing
Review ofCharles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 245, 955 P.2d 798 (1998)). While the majority
correctly asserts that we will defer to certain agency decisions in the agency's area
of expertise, majority at 7,this is not such an area. The interpretation and application
of criminal felony statutes falls within this court's, not the Department's, expertise.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Southwick, Inc. v. Dep't ofLicensing Bus. & Professions Div.,^o. 95237-0
(Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
Analysis
I. The rules of statutory interpretation applicable to this case are plain
language, context, and other "aids to interpretation," including
legislative history and the rule of lenity
We therefore turn directly to our rules ofstatutory interpretation. We start with
the plain language ofthe statute, examined in the context ofthe statutory scheme as
a whole, because that is the "surest indication" of the legislature's intent. Five