Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Citation
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Parent Document
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 1979-01-22
Other Sections in This Document (31)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
- Steinegger v. Rosario, 402 A.2d 1 (1979)
Full Text
1,026 charssecurity deposit, coupled with the provision of subsection (b) which makes only the clauses in subsection (a) unenforceable, indicates that subsection (c) was intended to be a separate and distinct right. If this were not the case and subsection (e) meant merely that a lease provision wherein the landlord attempted to avoid his responsibilities thereunder would be unenforceable, then there would be no point either in setting subsection (c) apart from subsection (a) or in employing different language from that in subsection (b) which provides the remedy for violations of subsection (a). Subsection (c) as such would be superfluous. Again, it is “an elementary principle of statutory construction that a statute should be construed so that ‘[n]o word in a statute should be treated as superfluous ... or insignificant.’ ” Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, supra, 100. See State v. Briggs, 161 Conn. 283, 287; Johnson v. Board of Tax Review, 160 Conn. 71, 74; and State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri,