Nor is there any argument available that the marital or spousal relationship between the co-owners varied the obligations of Janina Pearse, who was a married woman at the time of the critical events. Under General Obligations Law § 3-301, a married woman’s marital status is irrelevant to contractual obligations, and subdivision (1) thereof provides that “[a] married woman has all the rights in respect to property . . . and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person, including her husband, . . . and be liable on such contracts, as if she were unmarried.” A married woman’s economic emancipation and independent rights and obligations in relation to real property have long been recognized under New York law (see L 1848, ch 200, § 3, as amended by L 1849, ch 375 [known as the Married Women’s Property Act]; generally, Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Geo LJ 1359 [1983]; Richard H. Chused, History’s Double Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 Geo LJ 2213 [1994] [observing that such enactments followed shortly after the notable Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 and were only partially based upon suffrage and feminist theories then being advanced]). And, of course, to the extent the wife designated the *972husband as her agent for the treatment of the security deposit, she cannot escape liability (45 NY Jur 2d, Domestic Relations § 271 [Managing wife’s business] [“Pursuant to the power vested in married women to carry on a trade, business, or occupation, a married woman may designate her husband as her agent to manage her trade, business, or occupation, and to purchase property therefor. Where she does so she becomes legally liable for the acts of her husband as such agent, the same as though the marital relation did no