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136 Misc. 2d 793; 519 N.Y.S.2d 178; 1987 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2501

Citation
136 Misc. 2d 793; 519 N.Y.S.2d 178; 1987 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2501
Jurisdiction
New York (state)
Source verification
cross_accepted_sealed

Full Text

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It is now 11 months since authorization was received. Can petitioner make the same allegations at this time in support of her eviction request? Will NYCHA still find those allegations sufficient? Does respondent now have additional information which would effect NYCHA’s decision? These questions can only be answered upon a new request for authorization on notice to respondent. To hold that the prior authorization continues to be valid when circumstances may likely have changed places respondent in a continuous and unsettling state of uncertainty. If the notice is still good 11 months and 1 proceeding later, is it still good 5 years and 5 proceedings *796from now? I think not. The authorization allows for commencement of a proceeding based on the grounds stated in it. Those proceedings were commenced and dismissed. In order to bring a new proceeding, reauthorization must be obtained.

Petitioner contends that since the authorization grants permission to commence "summary proceedings” this plural usage indicates that petitioner needs only a single authorization to bring as many proceedings as she deems necessary. However, "[s]o serious a result for tenants should not * * * be made to depend upon so slight a point of style.” (Haberman v Wager, supra, at 734.) The protection of respondent’s rights to be put on notice of an eviction proceeding outweighs petitioner’s argument.

Accordingly, the motion is granted and the petition is dismissed, without prejudice.

. This case was dismissed twice before the March 2, 1987 dismissal. The first proceeding, commenced on September 9,1985, was dismissed for failure to serve the requisite 30-day notice. The second proceeding, commenced February 25, 1986, was dismissed for failure to receive the NYCHA authorization.