The plaintiff in error, M, filed a writ of error with this court, seeking reversal
of the orders of the Appellate Court, the defendant in error, issued in
connection with certain attorney misconduct by M. The first of those
orders, which was issued after notice and a hearing, declared that M
had exhibited a persistent pattern of irresponsibility in handling her
professional obligations before the Appellate Court insofar as she failed
to meet deadlines, violated the rules of appellate procedure, and filed
a frivolous appeal. That order suspended M from the practice of law
before the Appellate Court for a period of six months and further
required, as a condition precedent to reinstatement, that M take certain
remedial steps. One of M’s clients in a separate action, W, subsequently
filed a grievance against her, alleging certain misconduct arising from
an appeal to the Appellate Court. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel there-
after sent a letter to the Chief Clerk of the Supreme and Appellate Courts
indicating that M had entered into a written retainer agreement with W
for the provision of certain legal services at the Appellate Court level.
Specifically, the retainer agreement provided that M would review rele-
vant trial documents and draft W’s appellate brief, while another attor-
ney, H, would argue W’s appeal before the Appellate Court. M also had
drafted a motion to file a late appeal in W’s case that H submitted to
the Appellate Court. In response to the letter from the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel, the Appellate Court, without notice or a hearing, issued a
second order clarifying that its first order had precluded M from provid-
ing legal services of any kind in connection with any Appellate Court
matter until her reinstatement. In her writ of error, M claimed that the
Appellate Court’s second order constituted an unconstitutional ex post
facto law because it retroactively prohibited conduct that was not
addressed in the first order, that the Appellate Court engaged in the
selective enforcement of attorney disciplinary rules when it issued its
first order, and that the Appellate Court engaged in racially disparate
and retaliatory treatment of minority attorneys, such as M, by issuing
both orders. M also claimed that the Appellate Court’s second order
violated her federal constitutional right to due process because it retroac-
tively prohibited conduct that was outside the scope of the first order
and without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. Held that M
could not prevail on her claim that the Appellate Court’s orders were
unconstitutional, and, accordingly, M’s writ of error was dismissed: the
Appellate Court’s second order did not constitute an ex post facto
law because the text of the relevant constitutional provision limits the
powers of the legislature and does not, of its own force, apply to the
judicial branch of government; moreover, this court declined to review
M’s claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory and retaliatory
treatment, as they were necessarily fact bound, and, therefore, this court
was not the appropriate forum to address those claims in the first
instance; furthermore, the Appellate Court acted within its discretion
in issuing the second order and did not violate M’s constitutional right
to due process by retroactively prohibiting the conduct at issue because
any reasonable attorney would have understood that the terms of the
Appellate Court’s first order, the unmistakable intention of which was
to preclude M from providing any services at the Appellate Court level
prior to reinstatement, prohibited M from proffering the retainer agree-
ment signed by W and that undertaking such appellate representation
was in defiance of that order, and, in the absence of the imposition of
any additional sanction on M in the second order, the Appellate Court
did not violate M’s due process rights by issuing that order without
prior notice or a hearing.
Argued December 19, 2018—officially released July 30, 2019