The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for the alleged
wrongful termination of his employment in violation of the statute (§ 31-
290a) prohibiting discrimination against employees exercising their
rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The
plaintiff had worked for the defendant since 2002, and, every year,
received a seasonal layoff notice with recall. In October, 2016, the plain-
tiff sustained a work injury, received medical treatment, and filed a
workers’ compensation claim. Approximately one month after the plain-
tiff filed his claim, he received a seasonal layoff notice without recall,
terminating his employment. The defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted, concluding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant discriminated
against the plaintiff in violation of § 31-290a. On the plaintiff’s appeal
to this court, held:
1. The trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not meet his initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden
shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411
U.S. 792), the plaintiff having presented evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action: the plaintiff presented
evidence that he sustained a work injury, reported his injury to the
defendant, received medical treatment for his injury, filed a workers’
compensation claim arising out of his work injury, and, thereafter,
approximately two weeks before he received his seasonal layoff notice
without recall, the defendant made the decision to terminate his employ-
ment, which showed a sufficiently close temporal connection between
the exercise of his rights protected under the act and the defendant’s
adverse action against him; moreover, the plaintiff produced additional
evidence sufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact as to whether the
adverse action took place under circumstances permitting an inference
of discrimination, including that, after he was examined at a medical
treatment center and provided a first work status report that assigned
him light duty work restrictions, the defendant’s safety personnel had a
conversation with the plaintiff’s treating physician, without the plaintiff’s
knowledge, which resulted in a second work status report that elimi-
nated the plaintiff’s light duty work restrictions and attempted to mini-
mize the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim, and an employee of
the defendant testified that the plaintiff had personal responsibility in
sustaining his work injuries, despite also acknowledging that the plaintiff
had not violated any company rule or policy when his injuries occurred.
2. The trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not meet his ultimate
burden under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. framework in proving the
defendant’s discriminatory motivation or demonstrating that the defen-
dant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual; the plaintiff
presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant as well
as evidence that the defendant’s proffered explanation was unworthy
of credence, including evidence of his disparate treatment relative to
other coworkers involved in an October, 2016 safety incident in that
only his employment was terminated, that the only other safety incidents
referred to by the defendant were work injuries where it was determined
that no rules or safety policies were violated, and evidence of direct
statements made by representatives of the defendant that the plaintiff
was held personally responsible for his work injuries, which factually
supported his allegation that the defendant had a retaliatory animus
directed against him for his work injuries.
Argued November 19, 2020—officially released April 20, 2021 Procedural History