The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of summary process, to regain posses-
sion of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant. The lease
agreement provided that the defendant would lease the premises for a
five year term commencing on June 1, 2011, and it included an option
to renew the lease for an additional five year term. To exercise the
option, the defendant was required to notify the plaintiff of its intent
to do so, in writing, 180 days prior to the expiration of the initial term
of the lease. When the defendant did not provide the plaintiff with
written notice of its intent to renew the lease by the applicable deadline,
the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit possession of
the premises for lapse of time. The day after the lease expired, the
plaintiff initiated this summary process action against the defendant.
After a trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
concluding that the plaintiff had met its burden of proving that the lease
had terminated by lapse of time and that the defendant had failed to
notify the plaintiff, in accordance with the terms of the lease, of its
intent to exercise its option to renew the lease for an additional five
years. On the defendant’s appeal to this court, held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly
rendered judgment against it on a theory of liability that was not alleged
in the revised complaint, as the complaint sufficiently alleged that the
plaintiff had initiated the summary process action for lapse of time:
paragraph 5 of the revised complaint specifically referenced the notice
to quit possession, which had cited lapse of time under the lease
agreement as the sole basis for the plaintiff’s alleged right to recover
possession of the subject premises, and because the notice to quit
possession was attached to the revised complaint as an exhibit, the
court properly considered it in rendering its judgment; moreover, in its
answer, the defendant admitted the allegations contained in paragraph
5, thereby acknowledging that it had received the notice to quit posses-
sion and, thus, had been notified sufficiently of the legal and factual
basis for which the plaintiff had initiated the summary process action.
2. The trial court’s finding that the term of the lease had expired was
supported by evidence in the record and was not clearly erroneous; the
lease, which was admitted into evidence at trial, stated that the term
of the lease would commence on June 1, 2011, and end on June 1, 2016,
and, therefore, when the plaintiff initiated the summary process action,
the lease had expired by its terms, and insofar as the defendant claimed
that the lease had not expired because the defendant had exercised its
option to renew it, the trial court expressly rejected that claim and
specifically found that the defendant had failed to provide written notice
to the plaintiff, in accordance with the terms of the lease, of its intent
to exercise its option to renew the lease.
Argued January 23—officially released April 17, 2018 Procedural History