ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- Citation
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- Parent Document
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2025-05-13
Other Sections in This Document (45)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
- ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
Full Text
2,398 charsbe for use and occupancy only, was served, however,
the defendant’s opportunity to cure was extinguished.
. . . Because the defendant did not pay his rent portion
prior to service of the notice to quit, his special defense
must fail.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.)
The defendant claims that the court erroneously found
that the lease agreement was not silent as to notice and
cure rights and, therefore, erred in holding that he had
no common-law right to cure. The defendant’s claim
‘‘presents a question of contract interpretation because
a lease is a contract, and, therefore, it is subject to
the same rules of construction as other contracts. . . .
Although ordinarily the question of contract interpreta-
tion, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a question
of fact . . . [when] there is definitive contract lan-
guage, the determination of what the parties intended
by their . . . commitments is a question of law [over
which our review is plenary]. . . .
‘‘The intent of the parties as expressed in [writing]
is determined from the language used interpreted in
the light of the situation of the parties and the circum-
stances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and . . .
the language used must be accorded its common, natu-
ral, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter of the [writing].’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC v. Duong, 227
Conn. App. 38, 46, 321 A.3d 489 (2024).
In arguing that the court erroneously found that the
lease agreement was not silent as to the right to cure,
the defendant asserts that the court erred in treating
the nine day grace period contained in the lease agree-
ment as a cure period. He contends that a grace period
is not a cure period. Because the defendant has pro-
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