The plaintiffs sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of
certain premises occupied by the defendant. The plaintiffs served on
the defendant a pretermination notice, alleging that the defendant had
violated her lease agreement, the house rules of the apartment building
where the defendant resided, and several statutory provisions (§ 47a-
11 (a) through (g)). Subsequently, a kitchen fire started in the defendant’s
apartment after she began cooking on her stove and then fell asleep.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs served on the defendant a notice to quit posses-
sion of the premises. The trial court rendered a judgment of immediate
possession in favor of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the court denied the
defendant’s motions to open the judgment and to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the defendant appealed to this court,
claiming that the plaintiffs served an insufficient notice to quit. Held
that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions to open
and to dismiss and the court had subject matter jurisdiction to render
judgment on the ground of nuisance: notwithstanding the defendant’s
claim that the notice to quit did not adhere to statutory requirements
(§ 47a-23) in the absence of a new pretermination notice regarding the
kitchen fire, a landlord is required to provide only the statutorily required
notices, the notice to quit was required to state only that the pretermina-
tion notice had been served and that the lease had terminated on the
ground of nuisance, and the notice to quit included language that the
defendant violated § 47a-11, which states that the defendant shall not
conduct herself in a manner that constitutes a nuisance, and, thus, the
pretermination notice provided the defendant with necessary informa-
tion, and the notice to quit satisfied jurisdictional requirements.
Argued January 22—officially released September 1, 2020 Procedural History