914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 720 (2024)

Citation: 914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 720 (2024)
Parent Document: 914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 720 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-07-16
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131828/914-north-colony-llc-v-99-west-llc/ ↗

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In order to comply with § 47a-23, a notice to quit
         must be unequivocal. See Getty Properties Corp. v.
         ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 407, 107 A.3d 931 (2015)
         (‘‘[i]n order to effect a termination, the lessor must
         perform some unequivocal act which clearly demon-
         strates his intent to terminate the lease’’ (internal quota-
         tion marks omitted)); Centrix Management Co., LLC v.
         Valencia, supra, 132 Conn. App. 589–90 (‘‘a paramount
         consideration is the goal of insulating the tenant from
         confusion and uncertainty’’). Furthermore, despite the
         service of an unequivocal notice to quit, a landlord’s
         subsequent conduct ‘‘can render the landlord’s intent
         to terminate the tenancy equivocal, repudiate the intent
         to terminate set forth in the notice to quit, and reinstate
         the lease.’’ J. M. v. E. M., 216 Conn. App. 814, 820, 286
         A.3d 929 (2022); see also Centrix Management Co., LLC
         v. Valencia, supra, 589–90 (concluding that unequivocal
         notice to quit was rendered equivocal by landlord’s
         later written and spoken statements inconsistent with
         termination of tenant’s lease). If the notice to quit is
         rendered equivocal by the landlord’s actions and the
         lease is deemed to be reinstated, the court lacks subject
         matter jurisdiction over the summary process action.
         See generally J. M. v. E. M., supra, 820 (‘‘[a] notice to
         quit is a condition precedent to a summary process
         action and, if defective, deprives the court of subject
         matter jurisdiction’’).
           The plaintiff’s primary claim on appeal is that the
         court improperly concluded that its acceptance of pay-
         ments from the defendant after service of the notice to
         quit rendered the notice to quit equivocal. It argues
         that, because the notice to quit included a use and
         occupancy disclaimer and, considering that DiNardo
         expressly told Corrigan that the lease was terminated
         and would not be reinstated, any payments the plaintiff
         accepted after service of the notice constituted use and
         occupancy and, therefore, did not equivocate the notice
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