Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236 (1997)

Citation: Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236 (1997)
Parent Document: Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236 (1997)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1997-07-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7897210/grimes-v-housing-authority/ ↗

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Our state law with respect to relation back theory supports the Second Circuit’s view that changes in legal theories do not create different causes of action. Cullen v. Margiotta, supra, 811 F.2d 720-21. A long-standing principle in Connecticut is that “[a] right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action.” Pavelka v. St. Albert Society Branch No. 30, 82 Conn. 146, 147, 72 A. 725 (1909). This court has also held for relation back purposes that “ [a] change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff [as is alleged in this case] does not change the cause of action. . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sharp v. Mitchell, supra, 209 Conn. 71-72. Because the identity of the plaintiffs’ cause of action remains sub*249stantially the same as the Connelly cause of action arising out of the fact that the defendant failed to supply hot water, which it was obligated to supply, it is proper for the plaintiffs to amplify the allegations in the Connelly complaint.

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