Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Citation
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Parent Document
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 1996-01-30
Other Sections in This Document (24)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
- Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 40 Conn. App. 219 (1996)
Full Text
759 charsIn Gore, the Supreme Court first outlined the traditional principles of landlord premises law, stating that “as a matter of common law, a tenant’s claim for injuries caused by lead-based paint in the apartment would depend upon proof of control and actual or constructive notice of the conditions giving rise to the defective conditions caused by the lead-based paint.” Id., 374. The Supreme Court next considered the language of § 47a-8, its legislative history and purposes and concluded that a violation of § 47a-8 constitutes negligence per se. Id., 380-82. The Supreme Court further stated that notice is relevant to an action based on § 47a-8, *225noting that the legislature has not acted to eliminate the common law requirement of notice. Id., 382-83.