ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Ah Min Holding, LLC, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the defendant, the city of Hartford, on the plaintiff’s
claims that the defendant breached a tax abatement
agreement (agreement) regarding properties owned by
the plaintiff and known as the Clay Arsenal Renaissance
Apartments (CARA properties) and that the defendant
was unjustly enriched by that alleged breach. On appeal,
the plaintiff argues that the court improperly (1) read
into the agreement a term that the plaintiff must comply
with the General Statutes and certain provisions of the
defendant’s Municipal Code (code) relating to the main-
tenance of dwelling units, (2) concluded that the defen-
dant had a contractual right to terminate the agreement,
and (3) concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that
the defendant breached the agreement. The defendant
argues in response that the court properly read the
related statutes and code provisions into the agreement.
Further, the defendant argues that, because those provi-
sions properly were read into the agreement, the court
correctly determined that the defendant had the con-
tractual right to terminate the agreement because the
plaintiff failed to maintain the properties in accordance
therewith and that the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant breached the agreement. We agree with the
defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The plaintiff formerly owned the
CARA properties, thirty-four parcels of residential real
property in Hartford. The CARA properties primarily
were used as housing for low and moderate income
persons and families. On April 15, 2015, the plaintiff,
by and through its sole member Emmanuel Ku, entered
into the agreement with the defendant, wherein the
plaintiff agreed to maintain and rent a specified number
of dwelling units for low and moderate income persons
or families in order to receive the tax abatement pursu-
ant to the formulae provided in the agreement.
In relevant part, § 7 of the agreement required that
‘‘[m]onies equal to the amount of the tax abatement
provided for in this [a]greement shall be used by [the
plaintiff] solely for one or more of the following pur-
poses:
‘‘a. To reduce rents for the dwelling units on the
premises below the levels which would be achieved in
the absence of such abatement;
‘‘b. To improve the quality and design of such dwell-
ing units;
‘‘c. To effect occupancy of such dwelling units by
persons and families of varying income levels within
limits determined by the [state Commissioner of Hous-
ing], by regulation; and,
‘‘d. To provide necessary related facilities and ser-
vices in such dwelling units.’’
Section 8 of the agreement provided that ‘‘[t]he abate-
ment provided for in this [a]greement shall terminate
at any time when [the plaintiff] shall cease to maintain
approximately 150-156 units of housing solely for low
or moderate income persons or families on the premises
or when such units cease to fulfill the purposes set
forth [in] this [a]greement, provided that such abate-
ment shall not terminate if the [defendant] approves of
such cessation or if [the plaintiff] is unable to maintain
such units because of fire, act of God, governmental
action or any other cause beyond its control, in which
event the abatement provided for in this [a]greement
shall be adjusted proportionately to the number of such
units which [the plaintiff] is then maintaining on the
premises.’’ Additionally, the agreement required the
plaintiff to permit the defendant’s chief operating offi-
cer and the state Commissioner of Housing to ‘‘inspect
the premises at any reasonable time when an abatement
is provided pursuant to this [a]greement for any reason-
able purpose, including the purpose of determining
whether the premises are being used for the purposes
set forth in [§] 7 of this [a]greement.’’ If the defendant
or its Committee on Abatement of Assessments and
Taxes (committee) were to determine that the plaintiff
was not in substantial compliance with its obligations
under the agreement, the agreement could be termi-
nated following written notice to the plaintiff of such
determination and after a ninety day period in which
the plaintiff could correct the specified noncompliance.
Prior to February, 2018, the committee received
numerous complaints about the living conditions at the
CARA properties. These complaints informed the com-
mittee about a variety of deteriorating and hazardous
conditions, including rodent infestations, unattended to
mold in the bathrooms, floorboards coming up, and
various additional conditions of disrepair. In response,
the defendant’s housing code inspector, Kionna Owens,
conducted several inspections of dwelling units in the
CARA properties throughout the month of February,
2018. Owens discovered several code violations during
these inspections and, on March 5, 2018, sent the plain-
tiff notices of these violations. Each notice included
the specific code violations and specified a date by
which the plaintiff needed to correct the violations.
In April, 2018, Owens conducted additional inspec-
tions, which revealed nearly identical code violations
as those found in February. They included a continued
rodent and bug infestation; defective appliances and
plumbing, including sinks and toilets; peeling paint;
water damage and bulges in walls and ceilings; defective
or inoperable electrical devices, including smoke detec-
tors and outlets; and inoperable window locks and dam-
aged doors. As a result, on May 30, 2018, Owens again
sent violation notices to the plaintiff and specified that
these violations must be corrected by June 30, 2018.
After the April inspections, but before the May 30,
2018 code violation notices were sent to the plaintiff,
the committee held a meeting on May 16, 2018, to dis-
cuss the status of the CARA properties. During the
meeting, the committee unanimously voted to terminate
the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
On May 25, 2018, in accordance with the agreement, the
committee issued a termination letter to the plaintiff,
stating that the agreement would be terminated if it
failed to cure the alleged code violations within ninety
days. The letter stated that the decision to terminate
was premised on alleged violations concerning the liv-
ing conditions in more than eighty dwelling units of the
CARA properties. Specifically, the termination letter
stated: ‘‘It is the strong opinion of the [c]ommittee that
your continued failure to provide housing that is sani-
tary, safe and code compliant constitutes a serious lack
of substantial compliance with the [a]greement and a
breach of the contract with the [defendant] for which
this action is well-grounded.’’ The termination letter
included copies of the numerous notices of code viola-
tions dated March 5, 2018. At the time of the termination
letter, there were approximately ninety-nine outstand-
ing violations of the code and, upon reinspection, forty-
five of those violations continued. Those violations
were noted as ‘‘substantial in nature’’ and ‘‘compro-
mised the sanitary conditions [and] the health of . . .
the tenants of the buildings . . . .’’
The defendant took the position that after the ninety
day period passed without correction of the code viola-
tions, the plaintiff’s agreement with the defendant auto-
matically terminated.1 Several months later, on or about
November 29, 2018, the plaintiff sold the CARA proper-
ties. As part of the closing, the plaintiff paid the defen-
dant real property taxes in the amount of $176,628.15.
If the agreement had not been terminated, the plaintiff
would only have been liable to pay abated taxes in the
amount of $43,500.
On January 23, 2019, the plaintiff filed a two count
complaint seeking to recover the $133,128.15 in prop-
erty taxes it claims to have overpaid due to the allegedly
improper termination of the agreement. In count one,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached the
agreement when it failed to provide a tax abatement
for the 2017 grand list and required the plaintiff to pay
$176,628.15 in assessed real property taxes when the
abated amount would have been $43,500. In so doing,
the plaintiff essentially alleged that the defendant
improperly terminated the agreement because there
was no provision in the agreement requiring it to comply
with the code. In the second count, the plaintiff asserted
a claim of unjust enrichment because the defendant
‘‘unjustly, wrongfully and/or erroneously imposed,
assessed, charged and collected taxes far in excess of
the amounts called for under the abatement agreement
and the defendant imposed, charged and accepted tax
payments, interest and penalties far in excess of the
amounts that were properly due pursuant to the abate-
ment agreement.’’ In its answer, the defendant denied
the plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and unjust
enrichment and asserted a claim for setoff based on
fines for the continued violations of the code.2 A remote
virtual trial took place on April 14, 2021, at which the
parties stipulated to many of the material facts.3
After the trial and posttrial briefing, the court issued
a memorandum of decision in which it found in favor
of the defendant on both of the plaintiff’s claims. In
reaching its conclusion, the court found that compli-
ance with the relevant sections of the code must be
read into the agreement between the parties. The court,
relying on precedent from this court and our Supreme
Court, considered the express terms of the agreement
as well as any necessary implications arising from the
provisions of the agreement. The court specifically
stated that, in Connecticut, ‘‘[c]ontracting parties are
presumed to contract in reference to the existing law,
and to have in mind all the existing laws relating to the
contract, or to the subject matter thereof.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Relying on General Statutes
§§ 47a-74 and 47a-1,5 as well as § 18-2 of the code,6 the
court further concluded that the law existing at the
time of contract formation required the plaintiff to com-
ply with health and safety requirements in the mainte-
nance of the CARA properties. Thus, the court deter-
mined that these statutes and code provisions must be
read into the agreement.
On the basis of this reasoning, the court found that
the plaintiff made no meaningful effort to correct the
host of code violations at the CARA properties and that
these substantial violations evidenced that the plain-
tiff’s substandard maintenance of the housing units
ceased to fulfill the purposes set forth in the agreement.
In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly declined
to credit the testimony of the representative for the
plaintiff’s property management company, Robert
Prichard, whose testimony that the plaintiff had
approved additional funding to address issues identified
by the defendant and that the plaintiff had conducted
spot checks regarding repairs of the housing units was
not supported by any documentation. In accordance
with its factual findings and legal conclusions, the court
found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its obligations
pursuant to the agreement and rendered judgment for
the defendant. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
read §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code into the
agreement. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the
agreement’s definition of housing for low or moderate
income persons or families does not include a require-
ment that the housing must be completely free of
alleged violations of the General Statutes or the code
to be considered housing for low or moderate income
persons or families, nor does the agreement include a
separate provision requiring the landlord to comply
with provisions of the General Statutes or the code
cited by the court. The plaintiff also relies on General
Statutes § 8-215, the statute that forms the basis for
the agreement in question, to argue that there was no
contractual obligation to comply with §§ 47a-1 or 47a-7
or the municipal code. The plaintiff claims that, because
§ 8-215 does not expressly incorporate an obligation to
comply with §§ 47a-1 or 47a-7 or any municipal code,
the court improperly read those statutes and code provi-
sions into the agreement.
In response, the defendant argues that the court prop-
erly read §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code into
the agreement because ‘‘a fair and reasonable construc-
tion’’ of the plaintiff’s express contractual obligation
to ‘‘maintain’’ its properties includes the obligation to
complete repairs and general upkeep of the CARA prop-
erties. See Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Trans-
mission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 498, 746 A.2d
1277 (2000). The defendant argues that the statutes in
effect at the time of contract formation, specifically
§§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code, provide neces-
sary guidance for the required maintenance of low and
moderate income dwelling units. Therefore, the defen-
dant asserts that the standards in these statutory and
code provisions must be read into the agreement. We
agree with the defendant.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘Although ordinarily the question of contract interpre-
tation, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a ques-
tion of fact [subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of review] . . . [when] there is definitive contract lan-
guage, the determination of what the parties intended
by their commitments is a question of law [over which
our review is plenary].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit
Investment Management, LLC, 193 Conn. App. 381,
403, 219 A.3d 801 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911,
221 A.3d 446 (2020), and cert. denied, 334 Conn. 911,
221 A.3d 446 (2020). On appeal, when the issue of intent
is a question of law, ‘‘[this court is not] bound by the
trial court’s interpretation of the contract provision at
issue; rather, [this court has] an equal opportunity to
consider the words of the contract within the four cor-
ners of the instruments itself.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Axela New Britain Groups, LLC v.
LHPB Realty, LLC, 165 Conn. App. 694, 699, 140 A.3d
296 (2016).
Our interpretation of contract provisions is guided by
well established principles of contract law. ‘‘A contract
must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties,
which is determined from the language used interpreted
in the light of the situation of the parties and the circum-
stances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and . . .
the language used must be accorded its common, natu-
ral, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.
. . . Where the language of the contract is clear and
unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect
according to its terms. A court will not torture words
to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves
no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity
in a contract must emanate from the language used in
the contract rather than from one party’s subjective
perception of the terms.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Trans-
mission System, L.P., supra, 252 Conn. 498.
‘‘Contract language is unambiguous when it has a
definite and precise meaning about which there is no
reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. Briggs, 75 Conn.
App. 386, 394, 817 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 263 Conn.
912, 821 A.2d 767 (2003). When determining whether a
contract is ambiguous, ‘‘[a]ny ambiguity in a contract
must emanate from the language used by the parties.
. . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with
each provision read in light of the other provisions . . .
and every provision must be given effect if it is possible
to do so. . . . If the language of the contract is suscepti-
ble to more than one reasonable interpretation, the
contract is ambiguous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC,
311 Conn. 93, 103, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). ‘‘[T]he mere fact
that the parties advance different interpretations of the
language in question does not necessitate a conclusion
that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
Bearing in mind these principles of contract interpre-
tation, we concur with the trial court’s determination
that the agreement is unambiguous. Specifically, we
conclude that the plaintiff has a contractual duty to
‘‘maintain’’ the CARA properties, which encompasses
the obligation to provide repair and general upkeep
to the dwelling units. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
‘‘maintain,’’ as ‘‘[t]o care for (property) for purposes of
operational productivity or appearance; to engage in
general repair and upkeep.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th Ed. 2019) p. 1142. Thus, the ordinary meaning of
‘‘maintain’’ incorporates repair and upkeep. Although
the plaintiff argues on appeal that ‘‘maintain’’ refers
only to the continued use of the properties for the
purpose of low and moderate income housing, regard-
less of the condition of such dwelling units, the agree-
ment, when viewed in its entirety, does not support a
construction that strips the obligation of upkeep and
repair from the plain meaning of ‘‘maintain.’’ See Cruz
v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, supra, 311 Conn. 103.
Indeed, § 7 of the agreement specifies the plaintiff’s
obligations with respect to the upkeep of the CARA
properties, which include the duty to ‘‘improve the qual-
ity and design of such dwelling units’’ and to ‘‘provide
necessary related facilities and services in such dwell-
ing units.’’ Section 8 of the agreement also expressly
states that, if the plaintiff ‘‘shall cease to maintain
approximately 150-156 units of housing solely for low
or moderate-income persons or families on the prem-
ises,’’ or if the plaintiff fails to ‘‘fulfill the purposes
set forth of this [a]greement,’’ the abatement shall be
adjusted proportionately. (Emphasis added.) Further,
§§ 9 and 10 of the agreement provide that the plaintiff
shall give all assurances that the premises are used for
the purposes set forth in § 7 and permit inspection of
the premises ‘‘for any reasonable purpose,’’ including
determining whether the premises are being used in
accordance with § 7 of the agreement. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the other provisions of the agreement
support, rather than subvert, the plain meaning of the
term ‘‘maintain,’’ which by definition includes repair
and upkeep.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s mere assertion that we adopt
its interpretation of the term in question does not neces-
sitate a finding of ambiguity. See Cruz v. Visual Percep-
tions, LLC, supra, 311 Conn. 103. Indeed, the plaintiff’s
construction suggests that maintaining the properties
allows the plaintiff to provide housing that does not
meet minimum standards of habitability, which is pat-
ently unreasonable. Consequently, we decline to adopt
the plaintiff’s limited definition of ‘‘maintain’’ and,
instead, conclude that the only reasonable interpreta-
tion of the contractual term to ‘‘maintain’’ encompasses
the duty to repair and upkeep the CARA properties. We
therefore conclude that the agreement is unambiguous.
Our Supreme Court has also held that ‘‘[t]he law . . .
is that statutes existing at the time a contract is made
become a part of it and must be read into it just as if an
express provision to that effect were inserted therein,
except where the contract discloses a contrary inten-
tion.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn.
745, 780, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). When we incorporate a
statute as if it were an express term of the contract,
we do so in order to ‘‘construe the scope or validity of
an obligation already embraced within the terms of the
contract, [but] we do not incorporate the law to create
a substantive obligation where none previously had
existed.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 781. Furthermore, ‘‘[a]s
a general matter, parties are presumed to have con-
tracted with knowledge of the existing law, and contract
language must be interpreted in reference thereto. . . .
Unless the agreement indicates otherwise, a statute
existing at the time an agreement is executed becomes
part of it and must be read into is just as if an express
provision to that effect were inserted therein.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) LMK Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., 86
Conn. App. 302, 307, 860 A.2d 1229 (2004).
In the present case, we concur with the trial court’s
determination that §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the
code must be read into the agreement as if an express
term to that effect were present. First, it is undisputed
that these statutory and municipal code provisions were
in effect at the time the contract was formed. These
provisions plainly address the same subject matter—
the landlord’s duty to maintain residential rental proper-
ties—and further inform the terms of the agreement,
particularly § 7, with respect to rendering necessary
facilities and services to the dwelling units. Because
the obligation to maintain the CARA properties already
existed in the express terms of the agreement,
importing §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code into
the agreement serves only to define the scope of that
obligation and does not create a new substantive duty.
See Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 279
Conn. 781. Thus, because these provisions existed at
the time of contract formation and express an obligation
that already existed in the express terms of the agree-
ment, they must be read into the agreement just as if
an express provision to that effect were included in the
terms of the agreement. See id., 780; LMK Enterprises,
Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., supra, 86 Conn. App. 307.
In addition, the plaintiff does not dispute that it had
the obligation to comply with the requirements con-
tained in these statutory and code provisions at the
time it entered into the agreement and throughout its
ownership, but nevertheless attempts to argue that the
agreement was not formed in contemplation of these
statutory and code requirements and, therefore, the
maintenance obligations defined by the statutes and
code are not tethered to the agreement. As previously
discussed, however, § 8 of the agreement expressly
includes the obligation to ‘‘maintain’’ the CARA proper-
ties, which by definition includes the duty to engage in
general repair and upkeep. In order to construe the
agreement as the plaintiff suggests, there would need
to be an express provision to the contrary to relieve
the plaintiff of the duties contained in the existing statu-
tory and code provisions. See Deming v. Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 279 Conn. 780; LMK Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., supra, 86 Conn. App. 307.
Here, there is no express provision to that effect. Thus,
the absence of a contrary provision further supports
the conclusion that these provisions must be read into
the agreement to define the scope of the contractual
duty to maintain the CARA properties.
Ultimately, the existing statutory and code provisions
are consistent with the scope of the plaintiff’s existing
contractual obligation to maintain the CARA properties,
and there is no contractual provision providing that the
plaintiff does not need to comply with such require-
ments. Thus, these provisions must be read into the
agreement.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s reliance on § 8-215 does
not support the argument that §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and
§ 18-2 of the code were improperly read into the agree-
ment. Although the plaintiff is correct that § 8-215 does
not expressly direct a contracting landlord to comply
with §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code, § 8-215
does provide in relevant part that ‘‘[s]uch tax abatement
shall be used for one or more of the following purposes:
(1) To reduce rents below the levels which would be
achieved in the absence of such abatement and to
improve the quality and design of such housing; (2)
to effect occupancy of such housing by persons and
families of varying income levels within limits deter-
mined by the Commissioner of Housing by regulation;
or (3) to provide necessary related facilities or services
in such housing. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) For the
aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the require-
ment to ‘‘provide necessary related facilities or services
in such housing’’ actually supports the conclusion that
§§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of the code are merely
defining the scope of the existing obligation to maintain
the CARA properties and, therefore, must be read into
the agreement.
In light of the foregoing, §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-
2 of the code must be read into the agreement. The
plaintiff had the express obligation to maintain the
CARA properties, which included the duty to provide
repair and general upkeep. The statutory and code pro-
visions in question are consistent with this existing
express obligation to maintain the properties, and there
is no contrary provision relieving the plaintiff of the
duties described in these provisions. We therefore con-
clude that the court properly read these statutory and
code provisions into the agreement.
II
We next briefly address the plaintiff’s second and
third claims on appeal. The plaintiff argues in its second
claim that the court incorrectly found that the defendant
had the contractual right to terminate the agreement
based on violations of §§ 47a-1 and 47a-7 and § 18-2 of
the code. In its brief, the plaintiff relies on the assump-
tion that, in the absence of the housing maintenance
obligations set forth in those statutory and code provi-
sions, the defendant did not have a contractual right
to terminate the agreement based on the plaintiff’s fail-
ure to correct the numerous violations. The plaintiff
asks this court to apply the clearly erroneous standard
of review required in breach of contract cases; see Col-
liers, Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz, 77 Conn. App.
462, 471, 823 A.2d 438 (2003); but the plaintiff does not
assert any additional grounds to challenge the court’s
factual determinations with respect to the code viola-
tions. Instead, the plaintiff relies solely on its argument
that the court improperly read the statutory and code
provisions into the agreement to support its claim that
the court incorrectly determined the defendant had the
contractual right to terminate the agreement. Because
we conclude that the court properly read those provi-
sions into the agreement and the plaintiff cited no addi-
tional authority and made no additional argument that
the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, the
plaintiff’s second claim necessarily fails.
Similarly, in its third claim, the plaintiff argues that
the court incorrectly found that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the defendant breached the agreement. Here,
the plaintiff again relies on the assumption that the
court improperly read the statutory and code provisions
into the agreement and adds that, because the absence
of those provisions would deprive the defendant of its
contractual right to terminate the agreement for failure
to cure the cited violations, the court incorrectly found
that the plaintiff failed to prove breach. Again, because
we conclude that the court properly read those provi-
sions into the agreement and the plaintiff cited no addi-
tional authority and made no additional argument that
the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, the
plaintiff’s third claim also fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The termination letter stated in relevant part that ‘‘this termination is
effective [ninety] days from your receipt of this notice during which period
you have the ability to cure the deficiencies.’’ Testimony from the defendant’s
corporation counsel, Howard Rifkin, during a deposition in advance of trial,
confirmed that this term conveyed that the termination became effective
without further notice if the violations were not corrected within ninety days.
2
The trial court did not consider the defendant’s setoff claim and neither
party has raised any claims on appeal regarding it.
3
The following are the stipulations between the parties that were submit-
ted to the court on April 13, 2021:
‘‘a. [The plaintiff] formerly owned the [CARA properties].
‘‘b. On or about April 15, 2015, [the plaintiff] and the [defendant] entered
into the [agreement].
‘‘c. On May 25, 2018, the [committee] issued a letter to [the plaintiff]
indicating that the [agreement] would be terminated if [the plaintiff] failed
to cure alleged [code] [v]iolations within [ninety] days.
‘‘d. [The plaintiff] sold the properties on or about November 29, 2018.
‘‘e. As part of the closing, [the plaintiff] paid the [defendant] real property
taxes of $176,628.15.
‘‘f. The [defendant] treated the [agreement] as terminated and required
[the plaintiff] to pay the full balance of taxes owed without the benefit of
a tax abatement.
‘‘g. If the [agreement] was not terminated, [the plaintiff] would have been
liable to pay abated taxes of $43,500. Therefore, the amount in controversy
is $133,128.15 before accounting for any alleged setoffs.’’
4
General Statutes § 47a-7 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A landlord shall:
(1) Comply with the requirements of chapter 368o and all applicable building
and housing codes materially affecting health and safety of both the state
or any political subdivision thereof; (2) make all repairs and do whatever
is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition,
except where the premises are intentionally rendered unfit or uninhabitable
by the tenant, a member of his family or other person on the premises with
his consent, in which case such duty shall be the responsibility of the tenant;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating and other facilities and appliances
and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him; (5) provide and
maintain appropriate receptacles for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish
and other waste incidental to the occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange
for their removal; and (6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of
hot water at all times and reasonable heat except if the building which
includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that
purpose or if the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is
generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant or
supplied by a direct public utility connection.
‘‘(b) If any provision of any municipal ordinance, building code or fire
code requires a greater duty of the landlord than is imposed under subsection
(a) of this section, then such provision of such ordinance or code shall take
precedence over the provision requiring such lesser duty in said subsec-
tion. . . .’’
5
General Statutes § 47a-1 (c) defines a ‘‘ ‘[d]welling unit’ ’’ as ‘‘any house
or building, or portion thereof, which is occupied, is designed to be occupied,
or is rented, leased or hired out to be occupied, as a home or residence of
one or more persons.’’
6
At the time the parties entered into the agreement, § 18-2 of the code
provided: ‘‘No owner shall occupy or let to any other occupant any vacant
dwelling unit unless it is clean, sanitary and fit for human occupancy.’’
Hartford Municipal Code § 18-2 (Rev. to January 9, 2015). This section of
the code also included the same language, in relevant part, at the time of
the defendant’s alleged breach of the agreement. See Hartford Municipal
Code § 18-2 (Rev. to April 20, 2018).
We note that, currently, § 18-2 of the code provides: ‘‘The purpose of this
chapter is to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare with
respect to housing in the City of Hartford by achieving all of the following:
‘‘A. Enacting citywide standards for clean, safe, and habitable housing to,
among other things, promote the general health and well-being of residents,
improve indoor air quality, prevent asthma, reduce symptoms of allergies,
and minimize the presence of toxic levels of lead.
‘‘B. Empowering city officials to inspect properties to assess compliance.
‘‘C. Clarifying the scope of enforcement authority.
‘‘D. Aligning city ordinance with building code, anti-blight and property-
maintenance code, health code, fire code, and the zoning regulations adopted
by the planning and zoning commission.
‘‘E. Promoting sustainable practices.’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 18-2
(2022).