While the aforementioned claims do not survive the delivery of the deed, the Plaintiffs’ fourth count, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, does. This warranty, however, does not “impose on the builder an obligation to deliver a perfect house” or make actionable defects which are “trivial or aesthetic.” Albrecht v. Clifford, 436 Mass. 706, 711 (2002). To establish a breach, the Plaintiffs must prove that (1) they purchased a new house from the Defendant-builder-vendor; (2) the house contained a latent defect; (3) the defect manifested itself only after the purchase; (4) the defect was caused by the builder’s improper, design, material, or workmanship; and (5) the defect created a substantial question of safety or made the house unfit for human habitation. Id. at 711-12. The Plain*507tiffs meet the first criterion; the others are more difficult for them to prove. First, the defects which they cite in their demand letter are not “latent.” Latent means “hidden or concealed, not discoverable by reasonable and customary observation or inspection.” Id. at 713 (citation omitted). In his own deposition, Mr. Cook admitted that he “thought that these items would have come up.” Second, none of the items concerns the safety or habitability of the building. The Cooks did not vacate the property because of these defects, and the problems were not serious enough to mention to the Crowleys when they sold the house to them. Finally, this claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations, pursuant to G.L.c. 260, §2B. The date of the last inspection report was August 23, 2001; the Cooks did not file suit until November 21, 2005, more than four years later. For these reasons, summary judgment enters for the Defendants on Count 4.