Finally, the Authority contends that Cortes has failed to state a claim under either G.L.c. 176 or G.L.c. 93A for unfair claim settlement practices because neither statute applies to the Authority in the circumstances of this case. General Laws c. 176D, §2, proscribes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices “in the business of insurance.” As it is an entity whose creation, organization, and operation is a product of statute, G.L.c. 12 IB, it is prohibited thereby from operating at a profit, G.L.c. 121B, §32, first par., and its legislative mandate is to provide housing projects for families of low income, G.L.c. 121B, §26(e), the Authority is not in the business of insurance. See Poznik v. Massachusetts Med. Prof'l Ins. Ass’n, 417Mass. 48, 51 (1994) (“[T]hebusiness of insurance involves profit driven business decisions about premiums, commissions, marketing, reserves and settlement policies and practices” [internal quotation marks omitted]). As such, Cortes may not recover for unfair claim settlement practices under either G.L.c. 176D or G.L.c. 93A. See Morrison v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., Mass., 441 Mass. 451, 457 (2004) (“G[eneral] L[aws] c. 93A applies only to actions taken in the course of‘trade or commerce,’ . . . and has never been read so broadly to establish an independent remedy for unfair or deceptive dealings in the context of litigation, with the statutory exception as to those ‘engaged in the business of insurance’ ” [citation omitted]). ORDER