Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Y.A., 121 N.E.3d 1237 (2019)

Citation: Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Y.A., 121 N.E.3d 1237 (2019)
Parent Document: Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Y.A., 121 N.E.3d 1237 (2019)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2019-05-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7178398/bos-hous-auth-v-ya/ ↗

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Here, Y.A. did not raise the issue of domestic violence until she appeared in court for the hearing on the BHA's motion for issuance of execution on her alleged breach of the fifth agreement for judgment, and when she did so, it was not necessarily meant as a VAWA defense. However, neither the statute nor the regulations address when or how a tenant must assert his or her rights under VAWA in a summary process action. Cf. 34 U.S.C § 12491 ; 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005. See Matter of Johnson v. Palumbo, 154 A.D.3d 231, 244, 60 N.Y.S.3d 472 (N.Y. 2017). Nor does VAWA require a particular threshold of proof to raise the defense. See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(5) ; 24 C.F.R. § 5.2007(b)(3). Thus, here, Y.A.'s statement at the hearing that she was in an abusive relationship and that her partner "would take everything" from her was not untimely. Further, Y.A.'s mention of domestic violence as a possible *1244factor in her failure to make the required payments was a sufficient signal to the judge to inquire further to elicit additional facts in order to determine whether Y.A. was entitled to VAWA protection. See S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 2, Rule 2.6 & comment 1A (2016).

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